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STATEMENT OF CASE 
At issue is a lessee's duty to persons injured on adjacent property 1) owned, occupied and 
controlled by a third party lessor, and 2) retained by the lessor as a common area. Specifically, 
Plaintiff, Eileen McDevitt, claims to have fallen on a sidewalk in the Canyon Park Shopping 
Center located adjacent to a store operated by Sportsman's Warehouse, Inc. Plaintiff requests 
this Court extend Sportsman's liability to areas outside its leased premises. Sportsman's 
maintains that it owes no duty of care to persons on the private property of another. 
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
On December 20, 2007, Plaintiff filed her complaint alleging personal injuries from 
slipping or tripping while traversing a sidewalk in front of 1940 Bridgeview Boulevard, Twin 
Falls, Idaho.' The sidewalk referred to is private property contained within the Canyon Park East 
Shopping Center.2 Plaintiff named multiple defendants including: (1) various Canyon Park 
entities, owners of the Canyon Park East Shopping Center (collectively referred to as Canyon 
Park); (2) Neilsen & Company, LLC, property manager for Canyon Park; (3) Sportsman's; and 
(4) Eckman & Mitchell Construction, LLC, the general contractor during construction of the 
portion of the shopping center leased to Sportsman's? 
Sportsman's moved for summary judgment on September 25, 2009, on the basis that 
Plaintiff failed to produce evidence in support of her claim that Sportsman's owed a duty to her. 4 
I R Vol. I, p. 22. 
2 R Vol. I, p. 155; R Vol. II, pp. 272, 339; R Vol. I, p. 220, L. 2-10. 
3 R Vol. I, pp. 20-21. 
4 R Vol. I, pp 130-144. 
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Sportsman's presented evidence that (1) Plaintiffs fall occurred on a private sidewalk not 
contained within Sportsman's leased premises and (2) the sidewalk was a common area retained 
by Canyon Park.5 Sportsman's asserted it was not legally responsible for conditions existing 
outside its area of possession or contro1.6 Alternatively, Sportsman's argued that the sidewalk 
was retained by Canyon Park as a common area, for which Canyon Park is solely liable.7 
Sportsman's motion for summary judgment was opposed by Plaintiff and by Canyon Park. 
At summary judgment, neither Plaintiff nor Canyon Park argued that Plaintiffs fall 
occurred on Sportsman's property. The trial court found it undisputed that the sidewalk was not 
included in Sportsman's leased premises.8 Plaintiff instead argued for an expansion of Idaho's 
negligence law to impose upon commercial tenants a duty maintain and repair areas outside the 
leased premises, or alternatively, to find that Sportsman's was liable based upon allegations of 
prior control or having "created the hazard." The trial court rejected Plaintiffs arguments and 
granted Sportsman's motion for summary judgment.9 
Plaintiff filed a motion for reconsideration arguing for the first time that there was a 
dispute whether Sportsman's lease extended to the area of Plaintiffs fall. lO Plaintiff presented 
no new evidence that Sportsman's controlled the sidewalk, instead arguing that the recital page 
of the lease listed an approximate square footage for the building that differed from the proposed 
5 R Vol. I, pp 130-144. 
6 R Vol. I, pp 130-144. 
7 R Vol. I, pp 130-144. 
8 R Vol. I, pp. 340. 
9 R Vol. II, pp. 338-354. 
10 Tr Motion for Reconsideration Hearing, January 11,2010, p. 22, L. 5 to p. 23, L. 20. 
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square footage of the "Building" and "Premises" as defined in exhibits to the lease. Sportsman's 
pointed to the terms of the lease, the interpretation of the lease by the contracting parties, and the 
conduct of the contracting parties to show that Sportsman's lease did not extend to the sidewalk 
in question. To resolve any ambiguity, the trial court relied upon the undisputed testimony of 
Canyon Park's property manager, Tina Luper. lI The trial court adopted the contracting parties' 
definition of leased Premises, expressed by Ms. Luper, as extending only to the outer walls of 
Sportsman's Building.12 The trial court declined to reconsider its ruling and Plaintiff pursued the 
appeal before this Court. 13 
FACTS 
Canyon Park was the original developer of the Canyon Park East Shopping Center. 14 On 
May 17, 2001, Canyon Park recorded the Shopping Center's CC&RS. 15 The CC&Rs defined 
"Common Areas" as "all of the land area and improvements thereon which are located outside of 
the Buildings, including but not limited to, landscaped and hardscape areas, and all Parking 
Areas.,,16 The CC&R's also required that Canyon Park, "shall maintain, repair or cause to be 
maintained, repaired or replaced all Improvements in the Common Area ... " 17 
II Tr Motion for Reconsideration Hearing, January 11,2010, p. 22, L. 5 to p. 23, L. 20. 
12 Tr Motion for Reconsideration Hearing, January 11, 2010, p. 22, L. 5 to p. 23, L. 20. 
13 Tr Motion for Reconsideration Hearing, January 11,2010, p. 22, L. 19-23. 
14 R Vol. I, p. 155. 
15 R Vol. I, pp. 155-202. 
16 R Vol. I, p. 159. 
17 R Vol. I, p. 181. 
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On April 17, 2003, Sportsman's entered into an agreement with Canyon Park to lease a 
"Building" to be constructed within the Canyon Park East Shopping Center. 18 Pursuant to the 
lease agreement, Canyon Park was to make the site "pad ready" and to construct "Concurrent 
Site Improvements,,19 Canyon Park contracted with Idaho Scapes, Inc., to install the landscaping 
and irrigation system.20 Idaho Scapes placed an irrigation box in the area to become the 
sidewalk. 2 I Eckman & Mitchell constructed the sidewalk.22 The court found it disputed or 
unknown who directed Eckman & Mitchell's work and who paid for construction of the sidewalk 
area.23 
The Premises leased were defined as the portion of the shopping center that the Building 
was to be constructed upon and otherwise depicted by Exhibit B attached to the Lease?4 Exhibit 
B contains two site plans of the Shopping Center.25 Exhibit B-1 depicts the overall site plan of 
the shopping center and lists the square footage of the tenant buildings with building number 6 
titled "Premises" and with a listed area of 45,475 square feet.,,26 Exhibit B-2 is the site plan for 
the Premises.27 Exhibit B-2 contains a closer view of the proposed Building with its proposed 
18 R Vol. II, pp. 272-333. 
19 R Vol. II, pp. 276-277, 296-299. 
20 R Vol. I, p. 47. 
21 R Vol. I, p. 47. 
22 R Vol. II, p. 340. 
23 R Vol. II, p. 340. 
24 R Vol. II, p. 272. 
25 R Vol. II, pp. 296-299. 
26 R Vol. II, p. 297. 
27 R Vol. II, p. 298. 
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interior dimensions listed?8 The Building is shown with two primary rooms that combined have 
an interior area of 45,475 square feet. 29 
The exact square footage of the building, and the area of Plaintiffs lease, was to be 
determined after completion of the building.3o After completion of construction, the parties were 
to certify the actual square footage of the building.3l From the confirmed "Store Square 
Footage" the parties would calculate Sportsman's rent.32 
Tina Luper, the property manager for the Canyon Park East Shopping Center and the 
person designated as the Idaho R. Civ. P. 30(b)(6) representative for both Neilson & Company 
and Canyon Park, confirmed that the walls of the Sportsman's building formed the outer 
boundaries of the Gross Leasable Area (GLA) to Sportsman's.33 Luper testified that areas outside 
of the building's walls were retained by Canyon Park.34 And the sidewalk where Plaintiff fell 
was a common area under the exclusive control of Canyon Park through its property manager 
Neilson & Company.35 
Canyon Park was responsible for all maintenance and repairs to the Common Areas under 
both Sportsman's Lease and the Shopping Center's CC&R's. The lease stated that the Landlord, 
28 R Vol. II, p. 297. 
29 R Vol. II, p. 297; Exhibit B-2 illustrates the proposed building comprised ofa large room with dimensions of265' 
x 165' and a small room with dimensions of70' x 25'. The buildings dimensions can be calculated as (265 x 165) + 
(70 x 25) = 45,475 square feet. 
30 R Vol. II, pp. 273-274, ("Base rent during Lease Years 1-5 of the term shall be in an amount equal to the actual 
square footage of the Building (as certified to Tenant and Landlord by Tenant's licensed architect, the measurement 
of which shall be subject to confirmation by Landlord's licensed architect, surveyor or engineer.»; see also, R. Vol. 
II, p. 300, Exhibit C Schedule of Base Rent, (to be amended to reflect actual square footage of the building.) 
31 R Vol. II, pp. 273-274. 
32 R Vol. II, pp. 273-274. 
33 R Vol. I, p. 215, L. 8 to p. 216, L. 14; R Vol. I, p. 217, L. 3-14; R Vol I, p. 210, L. 5-16. 
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Canyon Park, "shall operate, maintain, repair and manage the Premises and Common Areas, 
including without limitation ... (b) cleaning, lighting, repairing, painting, maintaining, and 
replacing all improvements on the Common Areas ... such that at all times during the Term of this 
Lease, the Common Areas are in a good and safe condition ... ,,36 The CC&R's also place the 
duty to maintain Common Areas on Canyon Park or its designee.37 In Canyon Park's responses 
to Plaintiff s interrogatory asking who was responsible for maintenance of the recessed control 
box, Canyon Park responded, "the overall maintenance of the common areas within Canyon Park 
is the responsibility of Neilsen & Company.',38 
After completion of construction in September 2003, Canyon Park continued to inspect 
and maintain the common areas through its property manager Neilson & Company?9 Neilson's 
management contract extended to all Common Areas including sidewalks.4o Neilson & 
Company employee's Tina Luper and Diane Stevens conducted regular inspections of the 
Common Areas of the Shopping Center.41 Neilson's employee Diane Stevens admitted to 
discovering the elevation difference between the irrigation box (installed by Idaho Scapes) and 
the sidewalk area (installed by Eckman Mitchell Construction.)42 Having actual knowledge of 
this condition, Canyon Park elected to make no repairs. 
34 R Vol. I, p. 215, L. 8 to p. 216, L. 14; R Vol. I, p. 217, L. 3-14; R Vol I, p. 210, L. 5-16. 
35 R Vol. I, p. 215, L. 8 to p. 216, L. 14; R Vol. I, p. 217, L. 3-14; R Vol I, p. 210, L. 5-16. 
36 R Vol. II, p. 250. 
37 R Vol. I, p. 181. 
38 R Vol. I, p. 240. 
39 R Vol. I, p. 220, L. 2-10. 
40 R Vol. I, pp. 222-232; R Vol. I, p. 221, L. 3-20; R Vol. I, p. 242, L. 11 to p. 243, L. 22. 
41 R Vol. I, p, 245, L. 9 to p. 246, L. 16; R Vol. I, P. 247, L. 2-15. 
42 R Vol. II, pp. 322-323, Depo., p. 25 L. 23 to p. 30, L. 21. 
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Plaintiff claims that on December 21, 2005, she was a pedestrian utilizing the sidewalk 
area when she slipped or tripped over the irrigation box and fell, suffering injuries.43 Plaintiff 
had been shopping at another store in the Canyon Park East Shopping Center, TJ Maxx, just prior 
to the accident and fell while traveling along the sidewalk toward Sportsman's entrance.44 
Plaintiff alleged no negligence on Sportsman's part other than the proximity of Sportsman's 
leased premises to the portion of the sidewalk upon which she fell. 45 Plaintiff attributes her fall to 
a difference in elevation between the irrigation box and the sidewalk.46 After Plaintiffs fall, 
Neilson & Company inspected the sidewalk to determine whether to replace that portion of the 
sidewalk and instead painted a red band around the irrigation box. 47 
Pursuant to the lease, Canyon Park exercised exclusive control over the sidewalk. 
Anytime Sportsman's, or any other retailer, utilized the sidewalk area, it did so only after 
receiving express permission from Canyon Park's property manager, Neilsen & Company.48 
REQUEST FOR ATTORNEY FEES 
Sportsman's requests attorney fees pursuant to Idaho Code Sections 12-121 and 12-123, 
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 54 and Idaho Appellate Rules 35 and 41. The basis of 
Sportsman's request is that the case, and this appeal, was brought and pursued frivolously, 
unreasonably and without foundation. 
43 R Vol. I, p. 22. 
44 R Vol. I, p. 208, Depo., p. 45, L. 17 to Depo., p. 46, L. 11. 
45 R Vol. I, p. 209, Depo., p. 111, L. 1 to Depo., p. 112, L. 6. 
46 R Vol. I, p. 206, Depo., p. 50, L. 18 to Depo., p. 52, L. 3. 
47 R Vol. I, p. 235, L. 18 to p. 237, L. 13. 
48 R. Vol. I, p. 238, L. 8-25; R Vol. I, p. 249, L. 13 to 250, L. 19. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
When reviewing the grant of summary judgment the appellate court exercises free review 
in determining whether a genuine issue of material fact exists and whether the moving party is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.49 A motion for summary judgment shall be rendered 
forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, 
show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to 
a judgment as a matter of law. 50 Standards applicable to summary judgment require the district 
court and appellate courts upon review, to liberally construe facts in the existing record in favor 
of the party opposing the motion, and to draw all reasonable inferences from the record in favor 
f h . 51 o t e nonmovmg party. If the record contains conflicting inferences or reasonable minds 
might reach different conclusions, a summary judgment must be denied.52 However, the 
nonmoving party must submit more than just conclusory assertions that an issue of material fact 
exists to withstand summary judgment. 53 A mere scintilla of evidence or only slight doubt as to 
the facts is not sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact for purposes of summary 
49 Heath v. Honkers, 134 Idaho 711, 712, 8 P.3d 1254, 1255, (Idaho Ct. App. 2000). 
50 Idaho R. Civ. P. 56( c); Rawson v. United Steelworkers of Am., 111 Idaho 630, 726 P.2d 742 (1986); Schaefer v. 
Elswood Trailer Sales, 95 Idaho 654, 516 P.2d 1168 (1973). 
51 Tusch Enters. v. Coffin, 113 Idaho 37, 740 P.2d 1022 (1987); Doe v. Durtshi, 110 Idaho 466, 716 P.2d 1238 
(1986); Anderson v. Ethington, 103 Idaho 658, 651 P.2d 923 (1982); Kline v. Clinton, 103 Idaho 116, 45 P.2d 350 
(1982); Palmer v. Idaho Bank & Trust of Kooskia, 100 Idaho 642, 603 P.2d 597 (1979). 
52 Kline v. Clinton, 103 Idaho 116, 645 P.2d 350 (1982); Farmers Ins. Co. of Idaho v. Brown, 97 Idaho 380, 544 
P.2d 1150 (1976); Stewart v. Hood Corp., 95 Idaho 198, 506 P.2d 95 (1973); Lundy v Hazen, 90 Idaho 323, 411 
P.2d 768 (1966). 
53 Northwest Bee-Corp. v. Home Living Serv., 136 Idaho 835, 839,41 P.3d 263,267 (2002). 
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judgment.54 The moving party may meet his burden of showing that he is entitled to judgment as 
a matter of law by establishing the absence of evidence on an element that the nonmoving party 
will be required to prove at trial.55 The burden then shifts to the nonmoving party to show that 
there is indeed a genuine issue for trial. 56 
II. SPORTSMAN'S IS ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT AS IT OWED 
NO DUTY TO PERSONS UPON THE PROPERTY OF ANOTHER. 
Sportsman's is entitled to summary judgment based upon two well recognized, and often 
interconnected, principles. First, lessees of property are generally not liable for conditions 
existing outside their leased premises. 57 Second, when the lessor retains part of the premises for 
its own benefit, and/or the benefit of other tenants, as a common area, the lessor is solely liable 
for the condition of this area. 58 Both rules find their basis in holding responsible those parties 
that actually control, or have undertaken a duty to maintain, the area in question.59 
54/d. 
55 Nelson v. Anderson Lumber Co., 140 Idaho 702, 707, 99 P.3d 1092, 1097 (Ct. App. 2004); Dunnick v. Elder, 126 
Idaho 308, 311, 882 P.2d 475,478 (Ct. App. 1992). 
56 Nelson v. Anderson Lumber Co., 140 Idaho at 707, 99 PJd at 1097. 
57 Johnson v. Kmart Corp .. 126 Idaho 316,317,882 P. 2d 971, 972 (1994); citing 62A Am. Jur. 2dPremises 
Liability § 741 (1990); see also, Howe v. The Kroger Company, 598 S.W.2d 929, 931 (Tex. Civ. App. 1980); 
Johnson v. Tom Thumb Stores, Inc., 771 SW2d 582, 585 (Tex. Civ. App. 1989) (finding tenant store had not duty to 
customer injured by fall outside leased premises where plaintiff fell on light fixture in common area of shopping 
center). 
58 Liability of Lessee of Particular Premises in Shopping Center for Injury to Patron from Condition on Portion of 
Premises Not in His Leasehold, 48 A.L.R. 3d 1163; 62 Am Jur 2d Premises Liability § 16 (2008); 62A Am Jur 2d 
Premises Liability § 620 (2008); Hall v. Quivira Square Dev. Co., 675 P2d 931,932-933 (Kan. Ct. App. 1984) 
(finding that liability for common areas depends on which party occupied common area with intent to control and 
upholding summary judgment to tenant store where patron fell on uneven surface of mall parking lot where shopping 
center retained control and had duty to maintain common areas); Carcia v. Arbern Realty Co, 89 A.D.2d 616, (N.Y. 
App. Div. 2nd Dept. 1982) (overturning denial of summary judgment to tenant drug store for fall of patron in 
stairwell where stairwell not part of lease, tenant did not control stairwell and landlord had duty to maintain pursuant 
to lease); Johnson v. Tom Thumb Stores, Inc., 771 SW2d 582, 585 (Tex. App. 1989); Durm v. Heck's Inc., 401 
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A. A tenant is not responsible for conditions existing outside its leased premises 
Sportsman's owed no duty to Plaintiff while she was upon Canyon Park's property; thus 
Plaintiffs negligence claim must fail. The elements of common law negligence are (1) a duty, 
recognized by law, requiring the defendant to conform to a standard of conduct; (2) a breach of 
that duty; (3) a causal connection between the defendant's conduct and the resulting injury; and 
(4) actual loss or damage.6o 
The Idaho Court of Appeals in Johnson v. K-Mart Corp., 126 Idaho 316,882 P.2d 971 
(1994) determined that a tenant's general duty is limited to the area actually under the tenant's 
control. 61 In Johnson, the plaintiff fell in the parking lot outside K -mart's store.62 K -mart argued 
that the Plaintiff fell in an area outside its leased premises and therefore K-mart owed her no 
duty.63 The Johnson court recognized that pursuant to Harrison v. Taylor, 115 Idaho 588, 596, 
768 P.2d 1321, 1329 (1989), "a tenant or lessee having control of the premises is deemed, so far 
as third parties are concerned to be the owner. ... and may be liable for failure to keep the 
SE2d 908,911 (W. Va. 1991) (finding lessee of store in shopping center not liable to patron for injuries occurring in 
common area were lease agreement clearly stated that lessor had duty to maintain common areas); Raspilair v. 
Bruno's Food Stores, Inc., et ai., 514 So. 2d 1022, 1024 (Ala. 1987) (fmding tenants had no duty to patron who fell 
in shopping center parking lot where lessor retained lot as common area and lessor had contracted to clean and repair 
parking lot). 
59 Torres v. Piggly Wiggly Shop Rite Foods, Inc., 600 P.3d 1198, 1200-01 (N.M. Ct. App. 1979) (Finding that tenant 
had not assumed such control over common area as to become responsible for its maintenance and repair); Horn v. 
D.JM Associates et ai., 1997 Conn. Super. Lexis 1013 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1997); Hall v. Quivira Square Dev. Co., 
675 P2d 931,932-933 (1984); Durm v. Heck's Inc. 401 SE2d 908,911 (W. Va. 1991); Morris v. Scottsdale Mall 
Partners, Ltd., 523 N.E.2d 457, 458 (Ind. Ct. App. 1988); Beaney v. Carlson; The Lawson Milk Co., 189 N.E.2d 
880, 882-883 (Ohio 1963). 
60 Black Canyon Racquetball Club, Inc. v. Idaho First Nat 'I Bank, N.A., 119 Idaho 171, 175-76, 804 P.2d 900, 904-
5 (1991). 
61 Johnson, 126 Idaho at 317, 882 P.2d at 972. 
62 Johnson, 126 Idaho at 317,882 P.2d at 972. 
63 Johnson, 126 Idaho at 317, 882 P.2d at 972. 
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premises under repair.,,64 The Johnson court then recognized that tenants not in control of the 
premises owe no duty to third parties, stating, "a tenant generally will not be held legally 
responsible for conditions existing outside the area it has possession or control.,,65 
The Johnson court additionally found that, whether a tenant exercises control is a legal 
issue determined by the tenant's lease agreement. It noted, "[w]hether K-mart had control over 
the parking lot, and therefore bore legal responsibility for the lot's condition, turns on the 
operation of K-mart's lease agreement.66 K-mart's summary judgment was overturned only after 
determining that its lease extended to the parking area where Plaintifffel1.67 68 Here, Sportsman's 
leased property ended at its external walls. Accordingly, Sportsman's owed no duty to persons on 
the exterior sidewalk. 
B. Plaintiff has presented no basis to expand a commercial tenant's duty to maintain, 
repair, or warn of conditions beyond the area of its leased premises. 
There is no basis for imposing upon Sportsman's a duty to persons on the property of 
another. Plaintiff cites the New Jersey case Jackson v. K-rnart, 442 A.2d 1087 (N.J. Super. Ct. 
Law Div. 1981), for the proposition that businesses in New Jersey owe a duty to patrons to take 
64 Johnson, 126 Idaho at 317, 882 P.2d at 972, (emphasis in original); citing Harrison v. Taylor, 115 Idaho 588, 
596, 768 P.2d 1321, 1329 (1989). 
65 Johnson, 126 Idaho at 317, 882 P.2d 972. 
66 Johnson, 126 Idaho at 317,882 P.2d 972. 
67 Johnson, 126 Idaho at 318, 882 P.2d 973. 
68 The Ohio Supreme Court Stated in Beaney v. Carlson; The Lawson Milk Co., 189 N.E. 880 (Ohio 1963), " ... it is 
said that liability is an incident of occupation or control of the premises. In other words for liability to exist, there 
must be a breach of duty, which duty arises out of the occupation or control of the premises." Beaney, 189 N.E. 880, 
882. Connecticut courts have defmed control as "the power or authority to manage, superintend, direct or oversee 
and maintain." Horn v. D.JM Associates et aI., 1997 Conn. Super. Lexis 1013 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1997). 
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reasonable measures to keep adjacent sidewalks free of hazards.69 This holding, while not 
binding, also ignores subsequent New Jersey case law (1) refusing to require occupiers of land to 
maintain contiguous land owned by others,7o and (2) holding that tenants in shopping centers owe 
no duty to patrons traveling upon common area sidewalks (discussed infra).71 Plaintiffs 
argument also ignores the Idaho Case Heath v. Honkers Mini-Mart, Inc., 134 Idaho 711, 8 P.3d 
1254 (Ct. App. 2000), which discusses the New Jersey's approach before deciding not to impose 
upon Idaho landowners the duty to maintain adjacent property.72 
In 1981 New Jersey departed from the majority rule that landowners owe no duty to 
maintain or repair abutting public sidewalks. 73 In Stewart v. 104 Wallace Street, Inc., 87 N.J. 
146 (1981), the New Jersey Supreme Court imposed upon landowners the duty to maintain 
public sidewalks abutting private property.74 Then, Jackson v. K-mart, the New Jersey Law 
Division case cited by Plaintiff, sought to impose what would become known as the "Stewart 
rule," or the duty to maintain adjacent public sidewalks, to commercial tenants as well as 
landowners. 75 
In the subsequent case, Chimiente v. Adam Corp., 535 A.2d 528 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. 
Div. 1987), the court was asked to determine a landowner's duty to persons on adjacent private 
69 Appellant's Brief, 10. 
70 Chimiente v. Adam Corp., 535 A.2d 528 (N.l. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1987) 
71 Barrows v. Trustees of Princeton University, 581 A.2d 913 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1990) 
72 Heath, 134 Idaho at 714-715, 8 P.3d at 1257-1258. 
73 Barrows, 244 N.J. at 146, interpreting Stewart v. 104 Wallace Street, Inc., 87 N.J. 146 (1981) 
74 Barrows, 244 N.J. at 146. 
75 Jackson, 442 A.2d at 1090-1091. 
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property.76 Chimiente fell while traveling along a pathway leading to the defendant's property.77 
The property upon which Chimiente fell was owned by the State of New Jersey but not a public 
walkway.78 The Chimiente court recognized that even the "Stewart rule" did not impose upon 
landowners the duty to maintain the private property of another. 79 The court provided significant 
public policy considerations why New Jersey's negligence law should not be expanded further. 
Moreover, the public policy underpinnings to the Stewart rule simply do not apply 
to a private pathway over property that is not owned by the commercial 
landowner. Stewart's concern that the "no liability" rule will leave innocent 
parties without recourse is inapplicable since the injured party may seek redress 
against the owner of the private property. While the Stewart rule gives the 
commercial landowner, "incentive to repair deteriorated sidewalks and thereby 
prevent injuries," here there is no such incentive, or indeed even a legal right, on 
the part of defendant's to assume control and maintenance over property owned 
by others.8o 
The Idaho Court of Appeals placed great weight on Chimiente when, in Heath v. Honkers 
Mini-Mart, Inc., 134 Idaho 711, 8 P.3d 1254 (Ct. App. 2000), it rejected a request to expand the 
duty of an occupier of land to persons beyond the outer bounds of his property. Heath slipped in 
a vacant lot adjacent to Honker's Mini-MartY Heath argued that Honker's was responsible for 
his fall because patrons traveled across the adjacent property for access to Honker's store. 82 This 
argument is essentially the same as Plaintiffs request that this Court impose upon commercial 
76 Chimiente, 535 A.2d at 529. 
77 Chimiente, 535 A.2d at 529. 
78 Chimiente, 535 A.2d at 529. 
79 Chimiente, 535 A.2d at 530. 
80 Chimiente, 535 A.2d at 530. 
81 Heath, 134 Idaho at 712, 8 P.3d at 1255. 
82 Heath, 134 Idaho at 714,8 P.3d at 1257. 
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tenants a duty to warn of hazards near the front of the store.83 
In reviewing Heath's claims, the Court of Appeals quoted from the Chimiente case for the 
proposition that there is no duty "upon commercial landowners to maintain contiguous lands 
owned by others simply because the public chooses to use the lands as a means of access to the 
commercial property. ,,84 The court also approved of Chimiente' s assessment that "a commercial 
landowner had no legal right to assume control and maintenance over property owned by others 
and used by trespassers to access the landowners business.,,85 
Unlike Chimiente and the Stewart line of cases, Idaho does not require occupiers of land 
to maintain adjacent property, regardless of whether the property is privately held or a public 
sidewalk. The Idaho Court of Appeals determined that an expansion of premises liability law to 
include a duty to maintain property outside the land holder's premises should come only from the 
legislature.86 Specifically, the Heath court held: 
Heath, however, urges this Court to expand the law of negligence in Idaho so that 
the owner of commercial property is responsible for conditions upon unoccupied 
adjacent property, that it does not control, which cause injury. We conclude that 
such an expansion of the law should rest in the hands of the legislative branch 
through codification of the law of negligence as it pertains to the duty of 
landowners. Therefore, we hold, as a matter of law, that a commercial landowner, 
who has no right to control or enter adjacent property, owes no duty of care to a 
h d· 87 trespasser on t at a J acent property. 
Plaintiff s argument would impose upon an occupier of land the duty to maintain his neighbor's 
83 Appellant's Brief, 9-lO. 
84 Heath, 134 Idaho at 714, 8 P.3d at 1257; quoting Chimiente, 535 A.2d at 530 
85 Heath, 134 Idaho at 714, 8 P.3d at 1257. 
86 Heath, 134 Idaho at 715,8 P.3d at 1258. 
87 Heath, 134 Idaho at 715,8 P.3d at 1258. 
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property, fundamentally changing Idaho negligence law to an extent that should only be 
undertaken with great caution and by the state's legislature. 
Here, it is undisputed that Plaintiff fell outside Sportsman's leased premIses. At 
summary judgment Sportsman's submitted the lease agreement and the testimony of Tina Luper 
as evidence that Plaintiff fell outside Sportsman's leased premises.88 Luper testified that 
Sportsman's Gross Leasable Area (GLA) was confined to the area within the building'S walls and 
all external areas were not leased to Sportsman's.89 Instead these areas were designated 
Common Areas, retained and controlled by Canyon Park.9o No party contested this fact at 
summary judgment and the trial court found "It is undisputed that the lease itself only covers the 
Sportsman's building to and including its exterior walls, not including the sidewalk.,,91 
In her motion for reconsideration, Plaintiff argued that an ambiguity exists in the lease.92 
Even assuming an ambiguity exists, however, Plaintiff failed to present evidence that the 
contracting parties intended for the Premises to extend to the area of Plaintiffs fal1. 93 And the 
trial court found Luper's testimony that the premises were confined to the exterior walls 
"undisputed in the record. ,,94 
In addition to Luper's testimony, Canyon Park and Neilson & Company's conduct during 
the lease demonstrates that the term Premises were limited to Sportsman's Building. Canyon 
88 R Vol. I, pp. 130-262. 
89 R Vol. I, p. 215, L. 8 to p. 216, L. 14; R Vol. I, p. 217, L. 3-14; R Vol I, p. 210, L. 5-16. 
90 R Vol. I, p. 215, L. 8 to p. 216, L. 14; R Vol. I, p. 217, L. 3-14; R Vol I, p. 210, L. 5-16. 
91 R Vol. II, p. 340. 
92 Tr Hearing on Motion to Reconsider, January 11,2010, p. 22, L.5 to p. 23, L. 20. 
93 Tr Hearing on Motion to Reconsider, January 11,2010, p. 22, L.5 to p. 23, L. 20. 
94 Tr Hearing on Motion to Reconsider, January 11,2010, p. 22, L.5 to p. 23, L. 20. 
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Park entered into a contract with Neilsen & Company for the management of the Common 
Areas.95 Neilson & Company's management contract extended to all Common Areas including 
the sidewalks.96 Neilson & Company employee's Luper and Diane Stevens conducted daily 
inspections of the Common Areas of the Shopping Center.97 Finally, anytime Sportsman's, or 
any other retailer, utilized the sidewalk area it did so only after receiving express permission 
from Canyon Park's property manager.98 
C. Tenants in multi-tenant shopping centers owe no duty to maintain or warn of 
conditions in common areas. 
Plaintiff does not appeal the trial court's determination that as a tenant in a commercial 
shopping center Sportsman's owed no duty to person in Common Areas. The trial court ruled, 
"[l]imiting a commercial tenant's obligation to warn is consistent with this court's conclusion 
that there is no general duty of care imposed on a commercial tenant in a shopping center to 
maintain an adjacent sidewalk when the tenant has no contractual liability to maintain the 
sidewalk. ,,99 
The trial court's determination followed the well established rule that, "where the 
landlord retains control over portions of the premises for itself or 'for use in common with other 
95 R Vol. I, p. 220, L. 2-10. 
96 R Vol. I, pp. 222-232; R Vol. I, p. 221, L. 3-20; R Vol. I, p. 242, L. 11 to p. 243, L. 22. 
97 R Vol. I, pp. 222-232; R Vol. I, p. 221, L. 3-20; R Vol. I, p. 242, L. 11 to p. 243, L. 22. 
98 R. Vol. I, p. 238, L. 8-25; R Vol. I, p. 249, L. 13 to 250, L. 19. 
99 R Vol. II, p. 353. 
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tenants,' the landlord, and not the tenant, IS responsible for the safe maintenance of such 
areas." I 00 
Once again, despite Plaintiffs citation to the New Jersey case Jackson v. Kmart, even 
New Jersey does not impose a duty on commercial tenants to maintain common areas. In 
Barrows v. Trustees of Princeton University, 581 A.2d 913 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1990) the Superior 
Court was asked to determine the duty owed by tenants in a multiple tenant mall to persons 
traveling from store to store along an exterior walkway.101 After summarizing New Jersey case 
law, including the Jackson decision, The Barrows court stated, "[b ]ecause tenants in a multi-
tenant shopping mall will not, absent a contractual obligation, have control or maintenance 
responsibilities for common walkways, or sidewalks, this court concludes that the duties imposed 
... do not extend to tenants in multi-tenant shopping centers.,,102 
It is undisputed that all sidewalks in the Shopping Center are Common Areas, owned, 
controlled, maintained, and occupied by Canyon Park. The Lease and the Shopping Center's 
CC&R's designate all areas outside the buildings as "Common Areas.,,103 Section 1.11 of the 
Shopping Center's CC&Rs further states that Canyon Park "shall operate, manage, maintain, 
repair and/or replace the Common Area.,,104 
100 Johnson v. K-mart Corp., 126 Idaho at 319,882 P.2d at 974; quoting, Torres v. PigglyWiggly Shop Rite Foods, 
600 P.2d 1198 (N.M. Ct. App. 1979); see also, 62 Am Jur 2d Premises Liability § 16; 62A Am Jur 2d Premises 
Liability § 620. 
101 Barrows, 581 A.2d at 914. 
102 Barrows, 581 A.2d at 915. 
103 R Vol. II, pp. 272, 280, 296-299; R Vol. I, p. 159. 
104 R Voi.I,pp.159, 181. 
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center. 
Luper confirmed at deposition that the sidewalk was a common area of the shopping 
Q: What are the common areas of the Canyon Park development? 
A: Of course, parking lot, landscaping, sidewalks. 
Q: SO this area where the two boxes were placed, would you include that as a 
common area? 
A: Yes. 105 
* * * 
Q: So everything outside the walls, though, IS not a part of the lease to 
Sportsman's Warehouse except-
A: Yes, that's correct. 
Q: That's why it's designated as a common area, I take it? 
A: Yes.106 
* * * 
Q: Did they also, -- I'm including the Sportsman's lease - require that Canyon 
Park maintain or repair those common areas? 
A: yes. 
Q: This may be a bad question. But is there anything that Sportsman's 
Warehouse itself was responsible for regarding the sidewalk outside of its store? 
A: not specified within the lease, no. 
Q: SO outside of the front doors, the responsibility of Sportsman's Warehouse --
the responsibility shifted to Canyon Park or Neilsen & Company; is that correct? 
A: Canyon Park is responsible to maintain the structural portions of the building 
and the common areas. to7 
Plaintiff has not appealed the trial court's finding that Sportsman's had no duty to 
maintain the common areas. Although Sportsman's has repeatedly asserted non-liability for 
common areas, Plaintiff has yet to cite a single case imposing liability upon a tenant in a 
105 R Vol. I, p. 217, L. 8-14. 
106 R Vol. I, p. 218, L. 8-14. 
107 R Vol. I, p. 219, L. 1-16. 
-18-
shopping center for the condition of common areas. For these reasons the Court should uphold 
summary judgment to Sportsman's. 
D. Even if Sportsman's previously controlled the sidewalk or created the dangerous 
condition, any liability was extinguished upon Canyon Park's exclusive possession. 
Sportsman's did not "create the hazard" or control the sidewalk area prior to Canyon Park 
taking possession. Even if Sportsman's was previously responsible for the area, however, any 
responsibility ended with Canyon Park's control of the premises. 
Plaintiff makes unfounded claims that Sportsman's "created the hazard" or previously 
controlled the area of Plaintiff's fall. 108 Plaintiff admits, however, that the irrigation box was 
placed by Idaho Scapes lO9 and that the sidewalk was constructed by Eckman & Mitchell. llo 
There is no evidence in the record showing who if anyone directed those entities' activities. I I I 
Pursuant to the lease agreement, Sportsman's was to construct the Buildingl12 while Canyon Park 
was responsible for "Concurrent Site Improvements" including paving all portions of the 
Premises and the Shopping Center designated for pedestrian travel. 113 The trial court found "it is 
either disputed or currently unknown: ... 2) who hired Idaho Scapes to install the "box", 3) who 
directed Eckman to pour a sidewalk around the "box" and 4) who paid for Eckman's services in 
108 Appellant's Brief, 6-7.2 
109 Appellant's Brief, 3; R Vol. II, p. 340. 
110 Appellant's Brief, 3. 
III R Vol. II, p. 340. 
112 R Vol. II, p. 276-277. 
113 R Vol. II, pp. 277, 306. 
-19-
pouring the sidewalk." 1 14 The trial court further determined that these issues were not material to 
the issue of Sportsman's duty to Plaintiff and did not preclude summary judgment.115 
Even if Sportsman's controlled the sidewalk during construction, the duty to maintain or 
to warn of its condition passed to Canyon Park upon Canyon Park's possession. Idaho follows 
the general rule that the vendor of real property who parts with title, possession, and control of it 
is permitted to shift all responsibility for the condition of the land to the purchaser. 116 Subsequent 
owners or possessors then assume responsibility for any dangerous conditions existing on the 
land. 117 In addition to requesting the court assume that Sportsman's previously controlled the 
premises, Plaintiff requests the court to overturn Idaho precedent and impose upon prior 
possessors of land a duty to maintain, or to warn of dangers upon, property they no longer 
possess. 
Plaintiffs arguments were previously rejected by this Court in the case Boise Car and 
Truck Rental Co v. Waco, Inc., 108 Idaho 780, 784-785; 702 P.2d 818,822-823 (1985). In 
Boise Car, this Court upheld summary judgment in favor of former tenants for dangerous 
conditions created before they transferred possession.11 8 Boise Car and Truck Rental ("Boise 
Car") brought suit against multiple prior tenants who possessed land where an airplane hangar 
had been constructed. 119 Due to defects in the construction, the roof of the structure blew off 
114 R Vo!' II, p. 340. 
[[5 R Vol. II, p. 350. 
[[6 Boise Car and Truck Rental Co v. Waco, Inc., 108 Idaho 780, 783; 702 P.2d 818, 821. 
[[7 Boise Car, 108 Idaho at 783; 702 P.2d at 821. 
[[8 Boise Car, 108 Idaho at 784-785; 702 P.2d at 822-823. 
[[9 Boise Car, 780 Idaho at 781-782.702 P.2d at 819-820. 
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causing damage to neighboring property owned by Boise Car. 120 Boise Car then brought suit 
against the prior tenants claiming that they 1) created, or negligently permitted to remain on the 
land, a structure which involved an unreasonable risk of harm to others outside the land; 2) 
breached a lease agreement, of which Boise Car was a third party beneficiary; and 3) failed to 
warn Boise Car of defects in the building. 121 
Boise Car argued that tenants should be liable for dangerous conditions remaining on the 
property after termination of their lease. 122 This Court examined the requirements usually 
contained in theories extending liability after the transfer of possession including Section 373 of 
the Restatement (Second) of Torts (1965).123 Section 373 states: 
1. Section 373 of the Restatement: 
373. Dangerous Conditions Created Before Vendor Transfers Possession. 
(l) A vendor of land who has created or negligently permitted to remain on the 
land a structure or other artificial condition which involves an unreasonable risk 
of harm to others outside of the land, because of its plan, construction, location, 
disrepair, or otherwise, is subject to liability to such persons for physical harm 
caused by the condition after his vendee has taken possession of the land. 
(2) If the vendor has created the condition, or has actively concealed it from the 
vendee, the liability stated in Subsection (1) continues until the vendee discovers 
it and has reasonable opportunity to take effective precautions against it. 
Otherwise the liability continues only until the vendee has had reasonable 
opportunity to discover the condition and to take such precautions. 124 
This Court then refused to adopt the restatement noting that it would impose "a more far-
reaching liability upon vendors of real property than this Court has formerly been willing to 
120 Boise Car, 780 Idaho at 781,. 702 P.2d at 819. 
121 Boise Car, 1081daho at 782, 702 P.2d at 820. 
122 Boise Car, J08 Idaho at 782, 702 P.2d at 820. 
123 Boise Car, J08 Idaho at 783-784, 702 P.2d at 821-822. 
124 Boise Car, J081daho at 783-784, 702 P.2d at 821-822. 
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adopt.,,125 Instead, the Court demonstrated that even if it were to adopt an exception to non-
liability for past possessors of property, Boise Car would fail to survive summary judgment. 126 
Plaintiffs claims against Sportsman's fail for similar reasons. Even if Idaho were to 
adopt an exception to the general rule of non-liability, Sportsman's would be entitled to summary 
judgment since: (1) Sportsman's did not "create" the condition within the sidewalk; (2) there is 
no evidence that Sportsman's knew of, or actively concealed, the elevation difference in the 
sidewalk at the time Canyon Park accepted the sidewalk; and (3) Canyon Park had actual 
knowledge of the sidewalk's condition and had reasonable opportunity to repair, which it failed 
to do. 
In Boise Car, this Court found that the prior tenants had not "created" the structure as the 
hanger was created by the non-party construction contractor and engineer who actually designed 
and built it. 127 Similarly, the party that "created" the condition here is either Idaho Scapes or 
Eckman & Mitchell Construction, the entities that installed the irrigation box and the 
surrounding concrete. 
The Boise Car court also found that no liability existed where the defendants "neither 
knew nor reasonably could have known about the defective roof beam connectors.,,128 Here, 
even if Sportsman's had control of the sidewalk during construction, there is no evidence that 
Sportsman's knew of any discrepancy in elevation at the time construction was completed. 
125 Boise Car, 108 idaho at 784, 702 P.2d at 822. 
126 Boise Car, 108 Idaho at 784, 702 P.2d at 822 
127 Boise Car, 108 idaho at 784, 702 P.2d at 822. 
128 Boise Car, 108 idaho at 784, 702 P.2d at 822. 
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Similarly, there is no evidence that once a change in elevation occurred, Sportsman's concealed 
any height discrepancy within the sidewalk. Logically, any abrupt change in elevation would be 
observable upon inspection. 
Canyon Park's employees did in fact observe the height discrepancy, after which no 
liability can be imposed on Sportsman's. Even if this Court adopted Plaintiffs logic, liability 
could continue only until Canyon Park, discovered the condition and had reasonable opportunity 
to take effective precautions against it. 129 Here, all parties agree that Canyon Park's 
representatives had actual knowledge of the height discrepancy yo As the party in possession of 
the common areas every day between the completion of construction in September 2003 and 
December 2005, the time of Plaintiffs fall, Canyon Park had ample opportunity to remedy the 
condition and chose not to do so. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court properly recognized that Sportsman's did not lease or control the area of 
Plaintiffs fall. There is no legal basis to impose upon Sportsman's a duty to maintain or warn of 
dangers upon property owned and occupied by another. Even if Sportsman's had some 
involvement in the construction of the sidewalk, any liability was extinguished upon possession 
of the sidewalk by Canyon Park and certainly after Canyon Park discovered the condition of the 
irrigation box. For these reasons Sportsman's requests this Court deny Plaintiffs appeal 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 20th day of July, 2010. 
129 Boise Car, 108 Idaho at 784, 702 P.2d at 822. 
130 R Vol. II, p. 341; R Vol. II, pp. 322-323, Depo., p. 25 L. 23 to p. 30, L. 21. 
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